Campaign 1914

  After Action Reports 

History of Campaign 1914

 Campaign 1914 was a World War 1 naval wargames campaign played by the Naval Campaigns Club. The campaign used a set of campaign rules, the “Naval Campaigns Club Campaign System”, or NCCCS for short, which is based upon the Avalanche Press “Great War at Sea” (GWAS) boardgame rules. The NCCCS differs from standard GWAS in that it is an umpire-moderated set of rules. Campaign “players” took on the roles of British (Royal Navy or RN) and German (Kaiserliche Marine or KM) naval commanders in the North Sea during World War 1, planning North Sea operations using the GWAS “North & Baltic Seas” map for movement purposes, and sending their moves, or “Movement Plots” (MP’s) to a non-playing, impartial “umpire”. The umpire then compared the MP’s of the opposing sides, using the Stolins/Stear Microsoft Excel-based “GWAS Search System” spreadsheet application as a campaign management “tool”. When opposing naval forces contacted each other, a battle might result, fought using the HPS Games John Tiller designed PC game “Jutland”.

 This informal “history” is the campaign umpire’s humble but earnest effort to record the events of the campaign such that players and other interested parties might better understand the events of the campaign as viewed from the umpire’s perspective. The umpire is the only person involved who “saw” the plans & movements of both sides, and is thus in a unique position to offer observations the campaign.
 

Dramatis Personae

Following is a list of Campaign 1914 “roles”, and of the NCC club members who have played those roles.

For the KM:

Vice Admiral von Ingenhol, C-in-C, High Sea Fleet: Dierk Walter

Rear Admiral Franz Hipper, C-in-C, Scouting Groups: Gary McClellan

Vice Admiral Prince Heinrich, C-in-C, Baltic Fleet, Local Patrol Forces, and Mine Warfare Forces: Mike Cox

Captain Peter Strasser, C-in-C, Naval Air Forces and U-boat Forces: John O’Day

For the RN:

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, C-in-C, Grand Fleet: Carl Selbo

Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, C-in-C, Battle Cruiser Force: Sean Brooks

Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, C-in-C, Channel Fleet: Peter Sablock

Commodore George Ballard, Admiral of Patrols: Rich Mercer

Commodore(T) Reginald Tyrwhitt, C-in-C, Harwich Force: Chris Trog, succeeded in the role circa Turn 120 by Jim Lynch

Commodore Roger Keyes, C-in-C, Dover Force: Al Berke until circa Turn 150, when Dover Force was added to Commodore(T)’s responsibility 

Campaign 1914 Umpire: Jim McConnell

Setting the Stage

 Over the winter of 2002-2003 the club laid the foundations for Campaign 1914 and tested the NCCCS rules in a series of three “trial run” campaigns, the “TR’s” as they came to be known. As the three TR’s were proceeding, the Umpire collated data for the full-blown campaign, intended to be a simulation of the whole of the naval war in the North Sea from August through December of 1914.

On May 15, 2003 the Umpire emailed “campaign start-up” documents to all players: the RN players got the “Campaign 1914 - RN OOB” and the “Campaign 1914 – RN Initial Instructions”, while the KM players got the “Campaign 1914 - KM OOB” and the “Campaign 1914 – KM Initial Instructions”. After a period of planning, the campaign got underway in earnest in June, 2003.

Initial RN Plans & Opening Moves

 The campaign began on the first day of the war, August 5, 1914. The initial operational planning by the RN was colored by the necessity of protecting the “BEF Transport”, the passage of the pre-war British standing army (the “Old Contemptibles” from England to the Continent. In the “Campaign 1914 – RN Initial Instructions”, the Umpire had informed the RN command that:

 “At the beginning of the war the RN faced an immediate major task. The pre-war agreements between the French and British General Staffs called for a rapid deployment of the British regular army (the BEF) to France, according to a strict timetable. The transport began on August 9, took about a week, and happened mostly at night. RN leadership was extremely nervous about this movement, but in the event the KM never tried to intervene, indeed the Germans were not even aware of the BEF’s existence at the time.

a)      Beginning with the 0000-0400 turn on Sunday, August 9 the BEF transport will begin. The movement will last one week, through the 2000-2400 turn on Saturday, August 15. It will thus span the first two “campaign weeks”.

b)      On any campaign turn during this 42-turn span on which the KM has any surface warships of TB size or greater in any zone west or south of zone W8 inclusive, the KM will earn VP’s: 1VP for each light ship (TB or CL), 2 VP’s for each capital ship (CA, BC, B, or BB).

c)      The KM leadership will not, repeat NOT, be informed as to this KM VP earning opportunity, or the dates to which it applies.”

The RN command’s response to this initial challenge was to mount extensive operations

in support of the BEF transport. C-in-C Channel Fleet took his force to sea west of the Dover Straits through August 15, while C-in-C Grand Fleet and C-in-C Battle Cruiser Force brought their forces south of the Long Forties in support. Harwich Force was also active to the west of the Helgoland Bight; basically, the whole of the RN was concentrated, in this early phase of the campaign, to prevent or interdict any KM move into the Channel, should the Germans choose to attempt interference with the BEF Transport. The RN fully expected the KM to “come out fighting”. To quote C-in-C Grand Fleet, in a communication to his subordinate RN officers, “Expect Armageddon within the week”. 

The KM’s Strategic Plan

But the RN’s hopes for early confrontation with the KM were thwarted by the KM command’s careful initial strategy. C-in-C High Sea Fleet had decided upon a policy of mounting surface-ship raids, using torpedo boats, upon the Allied Minor Trade Route from Britain to Norway, known as the Bergen Trade Route. His plan was to continue these raids, sinking occasional Allied merchant ships and earning campaign Victory Points in the process, until the RN command committed substantial resources to protecting the Bergen trade route. The KM hoped to learn of this desired RN “northern concentration” by use of airship and U-boat reconnaissance to the north of the H-row (see GWAS map). In the meantime the KM began laying extensive defensive minefields in the Helgoland Bight, an ongoing project which continued throughout C1914.

The next phase of the plan, once the KM had ascertained that the RN had committed forces to the north, was to then mount a major shore bombardment & offensive mining mission against the British east coast. This mission would involve sorties by both the High Sea Fleet and the Scouting Groups. The HSF would take a blocking position south of the Long Forties, covering the run-in to the English Coast by the Scouting Groups, which would bombard, lay mines, and withdraw.

The Course of Events

So while the RN was carrying out its initial operations in support of the BEF Transport, the KM was laying mines in the Bight and sending TB’s north to the Bergen Trade Route to attack British shipping. When the KM failed to put in an appearance in the Channel to attack the transports, the RN returned to port to re-fuel and rethink. And so passed the first ten days of the campaign.

By mid-August the KM had begun to succeed in its plan to sink merchant ships with northern TB raids. Each such raid was carried out by two TBs, and minor though the losses were in terms of Victory Points, the RN leadership began to grow concerned about the KM’s Fabian tactics. There was some discussion on the RN side about sending the Grand Fleet and Battle-Cruiser Fleet out along the Bergen Trade Route to try and interdict the KM raiders. Had the RN adopted this plan, it would have been doing exactly what the KM had hoped it would do.

Throughout much of this time the KM kept their only airship, the Zeppelin L3, ably commanded by John O’Day, patrolling west and north of the Long Forties, hoping to spot any RN forces which might be sent out from Scapa Flow or Cromarty to safeguard the Bergen Trade Routes. The KM also sent U-boats out to lie off Scapa and Cromarty, as well as other English North Sea ports, to provide reconnaissance information as well. L3 kept sighting RN coastal patrols, carried out by destroyer flotillas, but never any heavy ships.

The KM also mounted limited TB patrols in the Helgoland Bight, and on two different occasions in the first two weeks of the campaign these patrols ventured rather far to the west and encountered RN DD patrols near the English coast. In both cases the KM TB’s used their superior speed to run from their RN opponents. Unbeknownst to the RN one of these KM patrols ran out of coal near the German coast while returning home, their CO having failed to allow for the extra coal consumption entailed by the high speed steaming necessary to escape from RN pursuers. Dierk Walter was forced to take the HSF to sea to tow the errant TBs home, a cause of some merriment amongst junior KM officers, though Dierk himself did not see humor in the situation.

In mid-month the KM Zeppelin L3 returned to base to refuel, then was sent back north of the Long Forties to scout again for the hoped-for RN “northern concentration”. KM U-boats were also sent out again to lie off the English coast. But meanwhile the RN leadership was developing their own plan, one which eventually won the war for the RN.

The RN plan was called “Operation Runs with Scissors”, and it was hatched by the redoubtable Peter Sablock, C-in-C Channel Fleet. Peter persuaded his fellow RN officers that only a daring RN raid into German territorial waters had any hope of drawing the HSF out for decisive battle. He proposed to take his Channel Fleet, composed of the RN’s pre-dreadnoughts and older DD’s, along with nearly all the RN’s minesweeping assets, and move into the Helgoland Bight on a mission to both sweep up the KM minefields which the RN had learned the KM was laying, and to bombard the German coast itself! Peter reasoned that the KM’s leadership would not be able to endure such a provocation, and that the High Sea Fleet and the Scouting Groups would sortie to oppose the Channel Fleet’s incursion. Meanwhile, the plan called for Grand Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Fleet to come down from their northern bases and take up a supporting position near Channel Fleet, ready to pounce if and when the High Sea Fleet came out.

At the last minute, just as the operation was scheduled to commence, Jim Lynch, a new club member at the time and in command of Harwich Force, proposed a concurrent operation, which he named “Operation Extender”, in which the seaplane carrier assets of the RN were to accompany the rest of the fleet into the Bight, and from there launch seaplane reconnaissance missions over Wilhelmshaven. The mission was approved, but as events transpired the flights never took place.

The plan was agreed to, and put in motion late in the month of August. Grand Fleet and the BCF left Scapa and Cromarty respectively and headed south for the agreed-upon position in the Bight.

However, as the Grand Fleet made its way south from Scapa Flow it first proceed in an easterly direction at Carl’s direction, in order to approach the Bight from the NE and perhaps intercept KM raiders en route, should there happen to be any. It was at this very moment that the ubiquitous L3, returning from its refueling stop at Cuxhaven, sighted Grand Fleet from the air.

 The report, relayed instantly to Wilhelmshaven and HSF HQ, electrified the KM command leadership! Here was the opportunity! The Grand Fleet was at sea well to the north of the Long Forties, heading east! Here perhaps was the hoped-for “Northern Concentration”! 

L3 was ordered to keep track of Grand Fleet but lost track of its target overnight and failed to re-connect; unbeknownst to the KM, GF had turned SW to make for the agreed-upon support position in the Bight. But the KM leadership chose to believe that GF was likely to stay to the north, and thus they decided upon their long-delayed major surface ship raid on the English coast. The entire High Sea Fleet was ordered to sea, supported by the Scouting Groups, on a mission to both bombard the English coast and to lay mines off several English east coast coastal zones.

Unfortunately for the KM, the operation was put into effect almost immediately upon receiving L3’s report. It was decided not to wait for L3 herself to come south in order to scout in front of HSF’s chosen route to England. It also happened before the new U-boat patrols could get into position off the English ports, though one returning U-boat sighted and succeeded in torpedoing an RN pre-dreadnought as she was changing base along the English coast.

The Battle of Terschelling

The last week of August 1914 saw vast RN and KM forces converging upon one another in the North Sea, each unaware that its adversary was at sea as well. As fate would have it, the route by which Peter Sablock chose to approach the Bight with his Channel Fleet and Harwich Force was the exact reciprocal of the route which Dierk Walter chose for High Sea Fleet’s approach to the English Coast.

Channel Fleet and Harwich Force encountered High Sea Fleet a few minutes after noon on August 30, 1914, some 55 miles NW of the island of Terschelling, off the Dutch coast. Unfortunately for the RN, this unexpected encounter took place before the Grand Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were in their final supporting positions, intended to be some 30 miles to the NW of Channel Fleet. Instead, Jellicoe (Carl Selbo) and Beatty (Sean Brooks) were over 60 miles from Peter’s Channel Fleet flagship.

For the next 90 minutes or so Peter conducted a skillful game of “advance and retreat” with Channel Fleet. His 18 old pre-dreadnoughts stalled for time in hopes that Grand Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Fleet could make up the distance and engage the High Sea Fleet before Channel Fleet was destroyed. Meanwhile Dierk and his KM sub-commanders Mike Cox, Gary McClellan and Phil Driscoll, thinking they might have succeeded in catching Channel Fleet alone at sea, sought to destroy Peter.

 Alas for the KM, it was not to be. Sean Brooks’ Battle Cruiser Fleet came on the scene about two hours into the battle, almost due north of the engaged forces of Peter and Dierk, and sought, at full speed, to interpose themselves between Dierk and his home bases. Soon thereafter the advance elements of Grand Fleet came on the scene as well, to the north of HSF and already somewhat to Dierk’s east.

Dierk realized the odds immediately, and after a hurried council of war with his subordinates he turned HSF east in an effort to fight past GF and BCF and return home. But pressure from the BCF and GF kept forcing him to the southeast, off his easterly course, and after some three and a half hours of battle Dierk opened up his comms and told Carl he would surrender the HSF, thus ending C1914.

At battle’s end the losses on both sides were great. Peter’s Channel Fleet and the Harwich Force had suffered terribly; nearly 75% of the DD’s in these two commands were sunk. Several of Peter’s pre-dreadnoughts

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